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1. Introduction 
A standard question in public choice is whether electoral motives and government 
ideology influence economic performance. Leftwing and rightwing governments have 
different preferences as to the size and scope of government and, thus, with respect to 
economic policy. Leftwing governments favor more state intervention, more income 
redistribution and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. In contrast, rightwing 
governments believe in the free market and favor less state intervention. Both political-
economic ideologies trust that these policies will improve economic performance. It remains 
of course an empirical question whether these two schools of thought have any merit. 
Manipulations of the economy because of electoral motives are independent of the 
government’s party color of the government:  incumbents will boost the economy before 
elections to increase their reelection prospects. 
The influence of government ideology and electoral motives on short-term economic 
performance has been described by the partisan and political business cycle theories which 
point to distinct cyclical patterns. The partisan theories, in a nutshell, predict that annual GDP 
growth is higher under leftwing governments because leftwing governments implement more 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. The traditional political business cycle theories 
predict that annual GDP growth is higher before elections because both leftwing and 
rightwing governments above all want to remain in power. Scholars have examined the 
predictions of the partisan and political business cycle theories in developed countries and 
come to different conclusions (see, for example, Alesina et al. 1997, Faust and Irons 1999, 
Heckelman 2006, Grier 2008).2  
                                                                        
2
 A related strand of the literature investigates the influence of government ideology on long-term economic 
growth. Examining decadal growth in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s for 58 countries, Bjørnskov’s (2005) results 
indicate that rightwing nations have grown faster than others. In a similar vein, Bjørnskov’s (2008a) results show 
that the relationship between income equality and economic growth depends on government ideology. 
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Most previous studies suffer, however, either from fairly short observation periods in 
panel data studies or focus only on a small group of countries. A more encompassing 
evaluation of whether political cycles have had an influence on short-term economic 
performance requires reliable data for many countries and many years. Such a dataset has 
recently been made available by Barro and Ursúa (2008). Econometric techniques also have 
improved considerably over the last years and should be employed in empirical research on 
political business and partisan cycles. Using the annual GDP growth data by Barro and Ursúa 
(2008), I reinvestigate the influence of government ideology and electoral motives on short-
term economic performance in OECD countries in the 1951-2006 period and provide a battery 
of empirical tests. 
The results suggest that in countries with two-party systems annual GDP growth  is 
boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a 
legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party 
systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental 
performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government 
ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses theoretical and empirical 
literature on political cycles and economic performance. Section 3 presents the data and 
specifies the empirical model. Section 4 reports and discusses the estimation results, and 
investigates their robustness. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Political cycles and short-term economic performance: theoretical 
background and empirical evidence 
The political business cycle approaches and the partisan theories indicate how 
politicians influence macroeconomic outcomes. One implication of the political business 
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cycle theories (Nordhaus 1975, Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990, among others) is that 
all politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before elections. In 
other words, political ideology retires to the background, and policies converge. The theories 
of political business cycles can be distinguished in models assuming adaptive (Nordhaus 
1975) and rational expectations (Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990) of economic actors. In 
the traditional approaches with adaptive expectations, opportunistic policymakers can take 
advantage of an exploitable Phillips curve trade-off. Opportunistic policymakers can fool 
naïve voters and stimulate the economy immediately before each election. In the approaches 
with rational expectations, informational asymmetries between politicians and voters take 
center stage in explaining electoral cycles. The incumbent exploits his information advantage 
to signal his economic competence before elections. The distinction in traditional and rational 
political business cycle approaches does not undermine the electoral advantages of engaging 
in expansionary fiscal and monetary policies before Election Day. The expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies do not have, however, an influence on economic growth, 
unemployment and inflation in the rational political business cycle model (see, e.g., Alesina et 
al. 1997: chapter 2). In recent contributions to this literature, Shi and Svensson (2006) develop 
a moral hazard model of political competition and show that politicians may behave 
opportunistically even if most voters know the government’s policy, but some voters are 
uninformed. The larger is the number of voters that fail (ex ante) to distinguish pre-electoral 
manipulations from incumbent competence, the more the incumbent profits from boosting 
expenditures before an election. Alt and Lassen (2006) point out that the greater is the 
transparency of the political process, the lower is the probability that politicians behave 
opportunistically.  
Empirical studies suggest that incumbents benefit from favorable economic conditions 
(see, for example, Hibbs 2006 for an encompassing survey of the literature), but the pattern 
depends on the policy field and the countries examined: electoral cycles are more likely to 
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occur in direct transfer payments such as public health expenditures (see, for example, 
Potrafke 2008) than in real outcome variables such as employment or inflation-adjusted 
growth (see the studies by Alesina and collaborators in the 1990s). The political business 
cycle theory appears to receive more support in developing than in developed countries (see, 
for example, Brender and Drazen 2009, Vergne 2009 and Shi and Svensson 2006). 
The partisan approach focuses on the role of party ideology and shows the extent to 
which leftwing and rightwing politicians will provide policies that reflect the preferences of 
their partisans. The leftist party appeals more to its labor base and promotes expansionary 
policies, whereas the rightwing party appeals more to capital owners, and is therefore more 
concerned with reducing inflation.3 Similarly to the traditional political business cycle model, 
the partisan approaches assume that the economy can be described by a (short-run) Phillips-
Curve-tradeoff and that politicians are able to exploit the tradeoff strategically by fiscal and 
monetary policies. With respect to short-term economic performance, the partisan models 
provide clear-cut predictions: leftist parties seek (or will accept) higher rates of inflation to get 
lower unemployment and faster growth, rightwing parties seek (or will tolerate) higher 
unemployment and slower growth to obtain lower inflation. This basic pattern holds for the 
classical partisan approach (Hibbs 1977) and also for the rational approach (Alesina 1987). 
The traditional partisan theory predicts a permanent influence of government ideology on 
economic policy-making. By contrast, the rational partisan theory claims that policy changes 
in the middle of legislative periods: leftist governments that have implemented an 
expansionary policy in the first half of the term, observe by midterm a significant increase in 
the inflation rate. Reelection concerns cause leftist governments to implement more restrictive 
policies in the second half of the term, so that inflation and economic growth decline. 
Conversely, rightwing governments had anti-inflationary recessions in the first half of the 
                                                                        
3
 Apart from class voting, partisan politics can also be grounded in, e.g., having different 'mental models' of the 
economy (Denzau and North 1994). 
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term, and rightwing governments pursue low inflation and accelerating economic growth in 
the second half of the term (Alesina et al. 1997: 62).4  
Empirical evidence examining whether parties have affected short-term economic 
performance is mixed. Alesina and coauthors find strong support for the rational partisan 
theory in OECD countries (e.g., Alesina et al. 1997). Hibbs (1987, 1992) also finds that 
parties mattered in OECD countries. Overall, Franzese (2002) has concluded that existing 
empirical studies typically uncovered stronger evidence of partisan than of electoral cycles in 
real economic performance. For encompassing surveys of the literature see, for example, 
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), Alesina et al. (1997), Price (1997), Franzese (2002), Franzese 
and Jusko (2006) and Drazen (2000: Chapter 7). More recent studies indicate that political 
cycles in short-term economic performance have also occurred in industrialized countries. 
Grier (2008), for example, examines quarterly data on GDP growth in the United States since 
1960 and shows that there has been an electoral cycle. The results by Ferris and Voia (2010) 
show that real output growth in Canada over the 1870-2005 period was permanently higher 
under leftwing governments and weakly increased before elections. For a panel of 19 OECD 
countries in the 1961-1981 period, Sakamoto’s (2008) results suggest that leftist governments 
had the lowest output growth when they had independent central banks but the highest output 
growth when they had dependent central banks.5 Rational partisan cycles occurred in 
Germany but not in the United Kingdom and Canada (Heckelman 2002a, b).6  
                                                                        
4
 Frey and Schneider (1978a, 1978b) have combined elements of the political business cycle and partisan 
schools, as politicians may plausibly be motivated by both opportunistic and partisan considerations. For 
example, an incumbent has strong incentives to take opinion polls into account: at times when he is popular, he 
may implement his favorite partisan politics, whereas he may engage in opportunistic behavior to increase his re-
election chances if opinion polls become sufficiently unfavorable. 
5
 On central banks and political business cycles see, for example Abrams and Iossifov (2006), Tempelman 
(2007), Abrams (2008), Ferris (2008).  
6
 Public Choice scholars have investigated extensively partisan cycles on economic policy-making in OECD 
countries. Helland (2010) investigates, for example, RPT cycles on unemployment growth in Norway. Aidt et al. 
(2011) provide new RPT tests employing data from Portugal.  On partisan cycles on German economic policy-
making see, for example, Belke (2000), Berger and Woitek (1997), Füss and Bechtel (2008), Schneider (2010), 
Mechtel and Potrafke (2009), and Potrafke (2011). 
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The existing empirical literature on partisan cycles has inconclusive elements. I will 
therefore test whether government ideology permanently influenced short-term economic 
performance (traditional partisan theory) or did so only early in the legislative session 
(rational partisan theory). The existing theoretical literature on partisan cycles ignores other 
potential influences of government ideology on economic performance. For example, 
economic policies that tend to improve short-term economic performance may well need time 
to be effective, government ideology may shift from one decade to another, or external shocks 
may affect ideology-induced policy making. I will also investigate these and other potential 
influences empirically. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data on annual GDP growth 
I use the dataset collected by Barro and Ursúa (2008) on real per capita GDP. The data 
are available for the 1870-2006 period and extend to a maximum of 36 countries. The 
government ideology indicator employed in this paper is, however, available only for 21 
OECD countries of this group. The reason is that government ideology is hard to measure 
when the political systems are unstable or undemocratic. Therefore, the analyzed dataset 
contains yearly data in the 1951-2006 period for 21 OECD countries:7 Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom and the United States (unbalanced panel).  
The data of Barro and Ursúa (2008) build on the GDP data of Maddison (2003) and 
have been improved and extended in several ways (for details see Barro and Ursúa 2008: 2 
ff.). The data for GDP are provided as indices, setting the values to 100 for each country in 
                                                                        
7
 Greece, Spain and Portugal became democracies in the mid 1970s so that government ideology can be coded 
from then on. Ireland and Luxembourg are not included in the dataset by Barro and Ursúa (2008). 
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the year 2000.8 The level of per capita GDP in each country in 2000 is set to the PPP-adjusted 
value in 2000 international dollars given in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (Barro and Ursúa 2008: 4). In the following, I focus on annual GDP growth. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that GDP growth in OECD countries was quite stable in the 
1951-2006 period. On average, GDP growth was 2.2%. Except Finland in 1993, Iceland in 
1952 and New Zealand in 1951, no economic disasters occurred in the examined 1951-2006 
period (on the growth acceleration in OECD countries see also Easterly 2006: 307 ff.).9 Over 
time, however, there was some variation. Recessions, for example, occurred in the mid 1970s 
(oil crises) and at the beginning of the 1990s in response to the end of the Cold War, and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows that recessions in the 1970s were 
particularly strong in countries such as Greece, Iceland, Italy and Portugal and in the 1990s in 
Finland and Sweden. I will use these annual GDP growth rates as dependent variables in the 
econometric model.  
 
3.2 The empirical model 
The estimated base-line dynamic panel data model to test the predictions of the 
traditional political business cycle and the traditional partisan theory model has the following 
form: 
 
GDP Growthit =  α Electionit + β Ideologyit + Σk γk Xikt 
+ δ GDP Growthit-1 + ηi + εt + uit                                             
 
with i=1,…,21; k=1,…,4; t=1,...,57                                                                     (1) 
 
                                                                        
8
 This classification refers to the working paper version by Barro and Ursúa (2008). 
9
 To isolate economic disasters, Barro and Ursúa (2008) basically follow the procedure in Barro (2006) by 
computing peak-to-trough fractional declines that exceed some threshold value. In this study, Barro and Ursúa 
(2008) apply a lower bound of  0.1. 
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where the dependent variable GDP Growthit denotes the yearly GDP growth rate in country i 
and year t. Panel unit root tests show that these series are stationary. Electionit and Ideologyit 
describe an election year variable and the ideological orientation of the respective 
government. In the next paragraph I describe these variables and their coding in detail. I 
include the election year variable and the ideology variable together in one regression because 
separate tests could cause omitted variable bias. Σk Xikt contains four exogenous economic 
control variables. I include the annual  GDP growth rate of the three most important trading 
partners (sum of imports and exports), the de facto exchange rate regime variable provided by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), the growth rate of trade openness (as a share of GDP) and the 
index of political constraints (POLCONII) by Henisz (2000). I calculate the annual GDP 
growth rate of the three most important trading partners based on bilateral trade data from the 
UN comtrade database and weight the GDP growth rates based on the trade share (sum of 
imports and exports) of the top three bilateral trading partners. The appendix contains a 
detailed list of the three most important trading partners and the weights.10 The de facto 
exchange rate regime variable takes on values between 1 and 5, where 1 describes a fixed 
exchange rate system (peg), 2 to 4 a floating and 5 a “freely falling” system.11 This variable is 
intended to capture the positive growth effects under floating exchange rates (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2004). Trade-openness (as a share of GDP) enters the model as the classic variable 
approximating globalization. The index of political constraints by Henisz (2000) takes on 
values between 0 (minimum of institutional constraints) and 1 (maximum of institutional 
constraints) and measures the degree of institutional constraints on the executive branch of 
                                                                        
10 The UN comtrade database contains missing values: “Countries (or areas) do not necessarily report their trade 
statistics for each and every year. This means that aggregations of data into groups of countries may involve 
countries with no reported data for a specific year. UN Comtrade does not contain estimates for missing data. 
Therefore, trade of a country group could be understated due to unavailability of some country data.” 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx. I compute averages based on the available data. 
Moreover: “Imports reported by one country do not coincide with exports reported by its trading partner. 
Differences are due to various factors including valuation (imports CIF, exports FOB), differences in inclusions/ 
exclusions of particular commodities, timing etc.” http://comtrade.un.org/db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx 
11
 “Freely falling” refers to countries whose twelve-month rate of inflation is above 40%. This category has been 
assigned in Reinhart and Rogoff´s (2004) dataset to some developing countries and periods at the beginning of 
the 20th century. In my sample only one year in Austria and ten years in Iceland are classified as “freely falling”. 
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government. The index includes veto players, such as two legislative chambers, and, thus 
controls for potential constraints on politicians to implement economic policies that influence 
short-term economic performance. The POLCONII is available until 2004. The appendix 
provides descriptive statistics for all variables included. GDP Growthit-1 describes the lagged 
dependent variable to tackle persistency in the data. Lastly, ηi represents a fixed country 
effect, εt is a fixed period effect and uit is an error term.     
The variable Electionit takes the exact timing of the elections into account. Following 
Franzese (2000), it is calculated as 
 
Election = [(M–1) + d/D]/12, 
 
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days 
in that month. In all other years, its values are set to zero. I thus directly control for the fact 
that the election dates differ between and within the individual countries.                
I employ the government ideology index proposed by Potrafke (2009a), which is 
based on the index of governments’ ideological positions by Budge et al. (1993) and updated 
by Woldendorp et al. (1998, 2000). This index places the cabinet on a left-right scale with 
values between 1 and 5. It takes the value 1 if the share of governing rightwing parties in 
terms of seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is between 1/3 and 
2/3. The index is 3 if the share of centre parties is 50%, or if the leftwing and rightwing 
parties form a coalition government that is not dominated by one side or the other. The index 
is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if the leftwing parties dominate. Potrafke’s (2009a) 
coding is consistent across time but does not attempt to capture differences between the party-
families across countries. Years in which the government changed hands are labeled 
according to the government that was in office for the longer period, e.g., when a rightwing 
government followed a leftwing government in August, this year is labeled as leftwing. For 
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this study, I extended this index for the 1951-1970 period. This specification implies that 
government ideology has a permanent influence on annual GDP growth. 
The estimated base-line dynamic panel data model to test the predictions of the 
traditional political business cycle and the rational partisan theory model has the following 
form: 
 
GDP Growthit =  α Electionit + β Ideologyit + λ First part legislative periodit  
    + ξ Ideologyit * First part legislative periodit 
+ Σk γk Xikt + δ GDP Growthit-1 + ηi + εt + uit                                             
 
with i=1,…,21; k=1,…,4; t=1,...,57                                                                     (2) 
 
The difference between equation (2) and equation (1) is the “First part legislative 
period” dummy variable that takes on the value one in the first part of a legislative period and 
zero otherwise and the interaction term between the “First part legislative period” dummy and 
the government ideology dummy variable. I distinguish between two alternative specifications 
for the first part of a legislative period: (1) only the first year and (2) the first two years of a 
legislative period. The reason for this distinction is that the rational partisan theory does not 
provide an exact prediction as to the duration of the effect in the first part in the legislative 
period and the related empirical studies therefore test for an influence only in the first year as 
well as in the first two years (see Alesina et al. 1997). The results will turn out to be sensitive 
to considering only the first year or the first two years of a legislative period. 
The first years of a legislative period are labeled according to the date at which a new 
government came into power after an election. When a new government came into power in 
the first half of a year, I label this year as the first year of its legislative period. When a new 
government came into power in the second half of a year, I label the next year as the first year 
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of its legislative period. The rational partisan theory predicts that governmental ideology 
influences annual GDP growth only in the first part of a legislative period. Thus, only the 
interaction term between government ideology and the first part legislative period dummy is 
expected to have a positive influence on annual GDP growth. 
I now turn to discussing my choice of the panel data estimation method. In dynamic 
estimations, the common fixed-effect estimator is biased. The estimators taking into account 
the resulting bias can be grouped broadly into a class of instrumental estimators and a class of 
direct bias-corrected estimators (see, for example, Behr 2003 for a discussion). In accordance 
with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), will be biased in my econometric model with N=21. For this reason, bias-
corrected estimators are more appropriate. I apply Bruno’s (2005a, 2005b) bias-corrected least 
squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models with small N.12 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Basic results 
Table 1 reports the regression results when a permanent influence of government 
ideology (traditional partisan approach) is investigated and shows that including different 
control variables does not affect the inferences drawn from the political variables.13 The 
control variables display the expected signs and their influence is robust across the different 
econometric specifications. The positive influence of annual GDP growth in the three most 
important trading partner countries corroborates the transmission of an international business 
                                                                        
12
 I choose the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator in which the instruments are collapsed as 
suggested by Roodman (2006). This procedure makes sure to avoid using invalid/ or too many instruments (see 
Roodman 2006 and 2009 for further details). Following Bloom et al. (2007) I undertake 50 repetitions of the 
procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. Bootstrapping the standard errors is common practice 
applying this estimator. The reason is that Monte Carlo simulations demonstrated that the analytical variance 
estimator performs poorly for large coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (see Bruno 2005b for further 
details). The results do not qualitatively change with more repetitions such as 100, 200 or 500 or when the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is chosen as initial estimator. 
13
 The results in the first column refer to a panel data model without a lagged dependent variable (feasible 
generalized least squares with robust standard errors).  
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cycle. The estimated coefficients of annual GDP growth in the three most important trading 
partner countries are statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (3) and (4) and at the 
1% level in column (5), implying that annual GDP growth increased by about 0.2 percentage 
points when annual GDP growth in the three most important trading partner countries 
increased by one percentage point. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at 
the 1% level with a coefficient of about 0.25. An F-test on the joint insignificance of the fixed 
period effects can be rejected strongly, which also indicates the persistency and time 
dependence of the dependent variables. The coefficient of the exchange rate system variable 
has the expected positive sign in columns (4) and (5), is statistically significant at the 10% 
level in column (5) but does not turn out to be statistically significant in column (4). The 
growth rate of trade openness has a positive influence on annual GDP growth and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (column 5). The index on political constraints does not 
turn out to be statistically significant and its inclusion also does not affect the inferences 
drawn from the political variables. 
The results in Table 1 show that electoral motives of the politicians and government 
ideology have had no permanent influence on economic performance in the 1951-2006 
period. The coefficients of the election year variable have the expected positive sign but do 
not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (1) to (5). The coefficients of the 
ideology variable also have the expected positive sign but do not turn out to be statistically 
significant across all specifications.  
Table 2 reports the regression results when the influence of government ideology in 
the first year of a legislative period (rational partisan approach) is investigated. The control 
variables display the expected signs and their influence is again robust across the different 
econometric specifications. Neither the ideology variable (leftwing), nor the first year 
legislative period dummy variable (except the coefficient in column 2 which is statistically 
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significant at the 10% level) nor the interaction term between the ideology variable and the 
first year legislative period dummy variable turn out to be statistically significant.  
Table 3 reports the regression results when the influence of government ideology in 
the first two years of a legislative period (rational partisan approach) is investigated. The 
ideology variable (leftwing) does not turn out to be statistically significant. The first two years 
legislative period dummy variable is, however, statistically significant at the 1% level in 
columns (2) to (5) and at the 5% level in column (1). The interaction terms between the 
ideology variable (leftwing) and the first two years dummy variable are statistically 
significant at the 10% level in column (1), at the 5% level in columns (2) to (4) and at the 1% 
level in column (5). These results indicate that annual GDP growth in the first two years of a 
legislative period is about 0.7 percentage points higher under a leftwing than under a 
rightwing government.14 The significant difference between the inferences drawn from Table 
2 and Table 3 may arise because (1) it takes more than some months or a year after an election 
for expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to have an influence on short-term economic 
performance and (2) coding of the first year of a legislative period is somewhat imprecise 
when a change in government occurs in the middle of a year. These basic results, however, 
need to be confronted with several concerns that are addressed in the following. 
 
4.2 Coding government ideology and its influence on economic performance 
The results could depend on the chosen government ideology indicator. Therefore, I 
have replaced Potrafke’s (2009a) government ideology indicator by an alternative one: 
Bjornskov’s (2008b) index refers to the Henisz (2000) database on political outcomes since 
the 19th century, and the general approach to measuring political ideology follows along the 
lines of Bjørnskov (2005b, 2008a). However, as compared to the index employed in 
Bjørnskov (2005b, 2008a), the Bjørnskov (2008b) index “takes the social democrat party in a 
                                                                        
14
 This example applies to shifts in the ideology variable from the score 2 (rightwing government) to the score 4 
(leftwing government). 
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given country as an internationally comparable anchor around which other parties are placed 
on a five-point scale (-1; -.5; 0; .5; 1) from left to right” (Bjørnskov 2008b: 5). The ideology 
scores of each government party are weighed by their relative share of all government party 
seats in parliament in order to consider differing degrees of influence on government policy. 
This procedure addresses the ideological position of the government and the parliament. In 
line with the partisan theories, Potrafke’s (2009a) coding implies a positive influence of 
government ideology (leftwing) on annual GDP growth, whereas Bjørnskov’s (2008b) coding 
implies a negative influence of government ideology (rightwing) on annual GDP growth. The 
Bjørnskov (2008b) index is available until 2004. 
The results show that Bjørnskov’s government ideology indicator does not turn out to 
be statistically significant. Thus, the result that government ideology has had no permanent 
influence on economic performance (traditional partisan theory) is not sensitive to the choice 
of the ideology measure. In a similar vein, neither the Bjørnskov ideology variable 
(rightwing), nor the first year legislative period dummy variable nor the interaction term 
between the Bjørnskov ideology variable and the first year legislative period dummy variable 
turn out to be statistically significant (rational partisan theory). By contrast, rightwing 
governments had lower annual GDP growth in the first two years of a legislative period. 
These results are shown in the additional tables. 
Apart from the predictions of the traditional and rational partisan theories I will test 
other potential influences of government ideology on annual GDP growth. For example, 
economic policies that tend to improve short-term economic performance may well need time 
to be effective. For this reason lagged government ideology variables are now included in the 
econometric model. When a single party has been in power for a fairly long time, however, 
the argument to consider lagged government ideology turns out to be less conclusive because 
this particular party has had enough time in office to implement its ideology induced policy. 
In any event, to address potential time-lagged ideology induced effects on economic 
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performance, I have replaced the government ideology variable in period t by its lagged 
values in the periods t-1 to t-5. The lagged government ideology variables do not turn out to 
be statistically significant. This finding is not sensitive to the choice of control variables. My 
results include several control variables to avoid caveats regarding potential omitted variable 
bias. I have also included the lagged Bjørnskov government ideology index: the results do not 
change. 
The government ideology index by Potrafke (2009a) implies a linear relation between 
the five different types of government. I have replaced Potrafke´s (2009a) government 
ideology indicator by dummy variables that take on the value one for every category of the 
government ideology indicator and zero otherwise.  To avoid multicollinearity between the 
government type dummies, one of the government type dummies serves as the reference 
category (here very powerful rightwing governments). The estimated effects of the other 
government type dummies can then be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. 
The government type dummies for the very powerful leftwing governments, the leftwing 
governments and center governments do not turn out to be statistically significant. The 
rightwing governments dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10% level and its 
coefficient has negative sign indicating that rightwing governments had somewhat slower 
annual GDP growth than very powerful rightwing governments. 
Electoral cycles could also be evaluated somewhat differently. For example, potential 
pre-election year effects could be addressed. For this reason, I have also included a pre-
election year variable that is coded similarly to the election-year variable to address the fact 
when elections have occurred quite early in an election year and, thus, most of the 
opportunistic activity is expected to have occurred in the pre-election year. Also this pre-
election variable does not turn out to be statistically significant; nor does the election-year 
variable. Moreover, substituting the election year variables by common 0/1 dummies does not 
change the inferences. 
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4.3 Results for sub samples 
The influence of political cycles may be more prevalent in two-party systems. The 
reason is that the majority party in a two-party system has full control of executive and 
legislative powers. By contrast, proportional electoral systems may result in fragmented 
legislatures with several parties forming coalition governments (Alesina et al. 1997: 141). I 
have therefore split the sample in countries with two-party systems (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) and countries without two-party 
systems.15 The results reported in Table 4 show that neither electoral motives nor government 
ideology permanently influence short-term economic performance in countries without two-
party systems. In contrast, for the group of countries with two-party systems, the results in 
Table 4 show that annual GDP growth was by about one percentage point higher in election 
years. The results in Table 5 show that government ideology in the first year of a legislative 
period did neither influence annual GDP growth into countries with two-party systems nor in 
countries without two-party systems (the result in column 4 reports an even negative influence 
of leftwing governments on annual GDP growth in the first year of a legislative period, but 
this effect appears to be a matter of the parsimonious econometric model). By contrast, the 
results in Table 6 show that annual GDP growth was higher under leftwing governments in 
the first two years of a legislative period only in countries with a two-party system. The 
countries with two-party systems appear to be the driving force of the effect in the entire 
OECD sample (Table 3). Because of the collineartiy of the election year variable and the first 
two years legislative period dummy variable in the no two-party system sample, the election 
year variable does not turn out to be statistically significant in columns (4) to (6). I have re-
                                                                        
15
 This distinction between countries with two-party systems (Westminster/Anglo-Saxon system) and countries 
without two-party systems relies on the assumption that both party systems can be clearly distinguished. 
Apparently, countries with multi party systems could be further distinguished in countries with a tradition for 
minority government (as in Scandinavia) and countries with more than two parties in parliament but clear 
distinctions of the political parties in a leftwing and a rightwing camp (such as Germany). In a similar vein, 
traditional countries with two-party systems may transform to multi-party systems. For example, in the United 
Kingdom in May 2010, a coalition government came into power for the first time. Future research could consider 
these transformations of party systems and further distinctions of party systems. In this paper, I follow the 
previous studies (e.g., Alesina et al. 1997) distinguishing countries with and without two-party systems. 
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estimated the models with the election year and ideology variable separately in order to check 
the robustness of this effect. Replacing the Potrafke ideology index by the Bjørnskov ideology 
index also does not change the inferences. 
External policy shocks can affect particular geographic regions. After the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, for example, particular strong recessions occurred in many European countries. 
For this reason, I have split the sample into European and Non-European countries (Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States). The results are similar to the two 
subsamples of two-party and non two-party systems. 
In a similar vein, I have also tested whether the absence of political cycles in the entire 
sample is due to the inclusion/exclusion of particular countries. These tests show that the t-
statistics of the election year variable drop down when Australia and New Zealand are 
excluded. In contrast, the t-statistics increase when Greece, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
are excluded so that the election-year variable turns to be statistically significant at the 10% 
level. In any event, the inclusion/exclusion of a single country does not change the inferences 
with respect to government ideology. 
Party ideologies change over time. The most visible changes are declines in political 
polarization and electoral cohesion. The empirical political science literature provides 
interesting insights as to why we ought not to expect modern parties to be ideological in any 
pure sense of the word (see, for example, Blyth and Katz 2005). Current empirical studies and 
ideology indices do not, however, take into account that parties have undergone these 
changes. So far, I can acknowledge only that the available government ideology indicators do 
not capture the fact that parties have changed. One possible way of testing for 
contemporaneous shifts in ideology is to interact government ideology with decadal dummy 
variables. I distinguish between the 1950s, the Keynesian era (from the Kennedy accession in 
1961 to Thatcher in 1979), the Washington Consensus years (1979 to about 1990), and the 
period after communism collapsed (the 1991-2006 period), and introduce dummy variables 
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for these time periods and interact those dummy variables with the government ideology 
indicators. The results in Table 7 show that government ideology had a permanent influence 
on annual GDP growth in the 1950s and the 1991-2006 period. In the 1950s, annual GDP 
growth was more robust under rightwing governments. In the 1991-2006 period, however, 
annual GDP growth was stronger under leftwing governments. The results employing the 
Bjørnskov index also suggest that annual GDP growth was faster under rightwing 
governments in the 1979-1990 period. In line with the result based on the Bjørnskov index the 
interaction term of government ideology (Potrafke index) and the 1979-1990 period dummy 
variable in Table 7 has a negative sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant at 
conventional levels. I also have tested the permanent influence of government ideology in the 
1950s, 1961-1978, 1979-1990 and 1991-2006 periods in the two-party and no two-party 
system subsamples. There are no systematic differences between two-party and non two-party 
systems except that higher annual GDP growth under rightwing governments in the 1950s 
was driven by the non two-party system countries. 
Political cycles could have had an influence on economic performance contingent on 
global business cycles. For this reason, I estimate subsamples for different time periods. 
Momentous historical events provide priors for potential structural breaks in the GDP growth 
series. The fall of the Iron Curtain and the following recession in Europe in the beginning of 
the 1990s, the first Gulf War in 1992, the oil crises in the 1970s and the period in the end of 
the 1950s, or beginning of the 1960s when the consequences of the Second World War were 
overcome, are prime examples. For this reason, I have considered these historical events as 
priors for structural breaks and applied Chow-tests to detect the structural breaks statistically. 
The Chow-tests suggest that a structural break has occurred in 1963/1964 and in 1992/1993. 
In contrast, the Chow-tests do not detect a structural break for any particular year in the 
1970s. I have therefore estimated subsamples for 1951-1963, 1964-1992 and 1993-2006. 
Moreover, I will discuss the results of reduced samples with splits in the 1970s and 1980s 
 20
below because of the availability of further control variables which I have performed 
additional robustness checks. The results show that the political variables did not have an 
influence on economic performance in the 1951-1963 and 1964-1992 period. Electoral 
motives have, however, influenced somewhat short-term economic performance in the 1993-
2006 period. This effect was again driven by the countries with two-party systems. 
 
4.4 Further robustness checks and discussion 
Globalization is likely to have a strong influence on economic performance. 
Globalization is, however, a multi-faceted process that cannot be captured by a single 
economic indicator such as trade openness. For this reason, I have replaced the trade openness 
variable by the growth rate of the KOF-index of globalization (2009 version) which is 
available for the 1970-2006 period (KOF means “Konjunkturforschungsstelle – Swiss 
Economic Institute; see Dreher 2006 and Dreher et al. 2008). Hence including this variable 
also restricts the sample to the 1970-2006 period and acts as a further robustness check. The 
overall KOF index, which captures social, political and economic globalization, does not turn 
out to be statistically significant. The economic sub index, however, is statistically significant 
and has a positive influence on economic performance. Including this index and examining 
the 1970-2006 period does not change the inferences on the political variables. 
The inclusion of further macroeconomic control variables could add explanatory 
power, following the partisan approach. Economic performance is expected to react directly 
to fiscal and monetary policies, such as higher government debt or lower interest rates. For 
this reason, I have included total central government debt (as a share of GDP) as a fiscal 
policy control variable. Total central government debt does not turn out to be statistically 
significant and does not affect the inferences of the political variables: the election-year and 
the government ideology variables lack statistical significance in this sample. Reliable data on 
total central government debt is hardly available. I have employed the OECD (2009) 
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Economic Outlook data that start in 1980 (unbalanced panel). Overall, including these data 
reduce the sample size dramatically and thus functions as a further robustness test. I did not 
consider monetary policy variables because modeling political cycles via monetary policy is 
beyond the scope of the paper.16  
The exchange rate regime index by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) implies a linear 
relation between the five different types of exchange rate regimes. I have replaced Reinhart 
and Rogoff ´s (2004) exchange rate regime index by dummy variables that take on the value 
one for every category of the exchange rate regime index and zero otherwise. To avoid 
multicollinearity between the exchange rate regime dummies, one of the exchange rate regime 
dummies serves as the reference category (here “freely falling”). The estimated effects of the 
other exchange rate regime dummies can then be interpreted as deviations from the reference 
category. GDP growth was lowest under floating exchange rate regimes when Reinhart and 
Rogoff´s (2004) index takes on the value 2. In any event, including these exchange rate 
regime dummies does not change the inferences regarding the political variables. 
I have tested for the existence of unrestricted serial correlation by applying the 
Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 2002: 176-177) in the panel data model. The test result indicates 
the presence of unrestricted serial correlation. Consequently, I have applied heteroskedastic 
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type (Newey and West 1987, Stock and 
Watson 2008) standard errors and variance-covariance estimates. The inferences with respect 
to the influence of the political variables on economic performance are not affected. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Electoral motives and government ideology did not permanently influence short-term 
economic performance in 21 OECD countries over the entire 1951-2006 period. In countries 
                                                                        
16
 Besides any concerns of data availability, including money growth and short term interest rates, for example, 
requires considering central bank independence.  
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with two-party systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States), however, annual GDP growth was higher before elections and in the first two years of 
a legislative period under leftwing governments. Moreover, annual GDP growth was 
somewhat higher under rightwing governments in the 1950s and somewhat higher under 
leftwing governments in the 1991-2006 period. The finding of political cycles in annual GDP 
growth in countries with two-party systems is in line with other recent empirical work on the 
United States (Grier 2008) and Canada (Ferris and Voia 2010). In countries with two-party 
systems, voters clearly can punish or reward a particular party for an implemented policy and 
they can elect a party to office that promises a better policy in the future. In countries without 
two-party systems coalition governments consisting of several parties have been in power. 
Coalition governments may have weaker incentives for aggressive economic policies: if a 
coalition lasts for another legislative period, the coalition partners will reap the majority of the 
votes anyhow. If the coalition government comes to an end, it is ambiguous which party 
should be blamed for the poor economic performance, or which party should be rewarded for 
improving short-term economic performance. Coalition governments can form in many 
different and often unforeseeable ways. Small parties may have decisive bargaining power in 
coalition negotiations. Even if voters are forward-looking, uncertainty about government 
performance is greater in a multiparty than in a two-party system. 
Three other explanations emerge as to why there are no stronger political cycles in 
short-term economic performance.  
First, leftwing and rightwing governments might have implemented similar fiscal and 
monetary policies which result in similar short-term economic performance. Empirical studies 
indeed suggest that policy differences depend on the policy and the time period considered. In 
fiscal policy, however, ideology induced differences are less pronounced. Rightwing 
governments, for example, do not spend significantly less than leftwing governments (see, for 
example, Sakamoto 2008). Hence, fiscal and monetary policy – the two most important policy 
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instruments for improving economic performance according to the partisan theories – did not 
appear as distinctive as theory predicts. 
Second, fiscal and monetary policies may not have influenced short-term economic 
performance at all. The empirical macroeconomics literature analyzes this issue (see, for 
example, Blanchard and Perotti 2002 and Mountford and Uhlig 2009). From a market-
oriented perspective, fiscal and monetary policy shocks are ineffective because rational 
economic agents identify the political straw-fire effect. An example for a straw-fire effect is 
that increases in government spending will only have a limited demand effect because tax-
payers realize that they need to pay back increases in government spending in future periods. 
Hence, the ideological party composition and electoral motives of the incumbents cannot play 
a significant role in short-term economic performance anyway. Empirical studies that deal 
with the influence of fiscal stimuli in times of the subprime crisis provide, however, mixed 
evidence on this predisposition. The results of Romer and Bernstein (2009), for example, 
suggest that an increase in government purchases has had a positive influence on GDP in the 
United States.17 The results by Cogan et al. (2009) show that Romer´s and Bernstein´s (2009) 
conclusions are not robust. In a similar vein, Cwik and Wieland (2009) show that the 
influence of government expenditure on GDP may be negative. Institutional constraints could 
also mitigate the influence of fiscal and monetary policies on short-term economic 
performance. In monetary policy, independent central banks play a significant role. In 
particular, independent central banks not only can counteract governments’ preferences with 
respect to monetary policy, but also can affect governments’ fiscal policies significantly 
(Sakamoto 2008). In fiscal policy, ideology induced policies could be counteracted when 
there is divided government (see, for example, Alesina and Rosenthal 1995 for an 
encompassing discussion of this issue).  
                                                                        
17
 It is important to note that Romer and Bernstein have been economic advisors to a Democratic President 
(Obama).  
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Third, leftwing and rightwing governments still have different views of economic 
policy and the design of the political order, but ideology appears to be restricted to non-
budgetary affairs. For example, market-oriented governments deregulated product markets in 
OECD countries in the 1980-2003 period (Potrafke 2010). Government ideology also has had 
a strong influence on political alignment with the United States: leftwing governments were 
less sympathetic to US politics (Potrafke 2009b). The distinctly different alignments of leftist 
and rightwing governments within the United States reflect deeper sources of ideological 
association than would be predicted if the issues were solely those of economic policy on a 
left-right spectrum.  
The political business cycles and partisan theories hardly relate to economic schools of 
thought and focus only on fiscal and monetary policy as policy instruments. Given the 
ideological preferences on economic policy and other policy fields, it is surprising that the 
political business cycle and partisan theories have not taken into account other policy fields. 
After all: for example, do leftist governments still believe that annual GDP growth will 
increase if they implement more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies? And do market-
oriented governments that implement restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, privatize state 
owned companies and deregulate product and labor markets believe that this kind of free 
market policy will have a positive influence also on short-run economic performance? 
The empirical evidence leads us to conclude that a more encompassing theory is 
required to explain how government ideology affects economic policy and thereby short-term 
economic performance. Such a theory should also consider industrial, regulatory and social 
policies and rely on the mechanisms and policy channels that translate government ideology 
into real outcomes. 
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Appendix: Data description and sources 
 
Table A1: Most important trading partners (sum of imports and exports) over the 1962-2006 
period. Source: UN Comtrade database, own calculations. 
Country 
Rank 1 
(trade share top three 
trading partners) 
Rank 2 
(trade share top three 
trading partners) 
Rank 3 
(trade share top three 
trading partners) 
Australia Japan (0.46) United States (0.36) Germany (0.18) 
Austria Germany (0.86) Italy (0.09) Switzerland (0.05) 
Belgium Germany (0.38) France (0.31) Netherlands (0.30) 
Canada United States  (0.91) Japan (0.05) Germany (0.04) 
Denmark Germany (0.65) Sweden (0.20) United Kingdom (0.15) 
Finland Germany (0.56) Sweden (0.25) United Kingdom (0.18) 
France Germany (0.55) Belgium (0.29) Italy (0.16) 
Germany France (0.41) United States (0.31) Netherlands (0.28) 
Greece Germany (0.60) Italy (0.25) Belgium (0.15) 
Iceland Germany (0.50) United Kingdom (0.26) United States (0.24) 
Italy Germany (0.62) France (0.23) Belgium (0.15) 
Japan United States  (0.68) Germany (0.22) Australia (0.09) 
Netherlands Germany (0.56) Belgium (0.32) United Kingdom (0.11) 
New Zealand Australia (0.41) United States (0.30) Japan (0.28) 
Norway Germany (0.44) United Kingdom (0.33) Sweden (0.22) 
Portugal Germany (0.52) Spain (0.31) France (0.18) 
Spain Germany (0.56) France (0.29) Belgium (0.16) 
Sweden Germany (0.59) Belgium (0.21) United Kingdom (0.20) 
Switzerland Germany (0.73) France (0.14) Italy (0.13) 
United Kingdom Germany (0.51) Belgium (0.25) United States (0.24) 
United States Canada (0.48) Japan (0.28) Germany (0.24) 

 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
GDP 1176 59.01 23.24 9.67 100.41 Barro and Ursúa (2008)  
GDP growth 1176 0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.12 Barro and Ursúa (2008)  
Election year 1102 0.17 0.30 0 0.99 Potrafke (2008),  further own calculations 
Ideology (leftwing) 
Potrafke-Index 1099 2.89 0.90 1 5 
Potrafke (2009a),  
further own calculations 
Ideology (rightwing) 
Bjørnskov-Index 1058 0.33 0.35 -0.57 1 Bjørnskov (2008b) 
First half legislative period 
dummy (1 year) 1102 0.29 0.45 0 1 Own calculations 
First half legislative period 
dummy (2 years) 1102 0.56 0.50 0 1 Own calculations 
GDP growth 
Most important trading 
partners 
1176 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.10 United Nations (2010), further own calculations 
Exchange Rate System 1176 1.96 1.03 1 5 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Trade (as a share of GDP) 1157 54.64 26.80 7.42 172.19 Penn World Tables 6.3 Summers and Heston (1991) 
Institutional constraints 1131 0.44 0.14 0 0.71 Henisz (2000) 
KOF index of globalization 
(overall) 777 70.63 12.35 37.46 93.46 
Dreher (2006),  
Dreher et al. (2008) 
Total central government 
debt (as a share of GDP) 493 49.80 28.06 5.97 163.57 OECD (2009) 
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Table 1:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.003 0.0029 0.0027 0.0028 0.0031 
 [1.70] [1.29] [1.20] [1.24] [1.58] 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0008 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 
 [0.88] [0.48] [0.42] [0.32] [0.77] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1995** 0.2002** 0.2647*** 
   [2.45] [2.46] [3.14] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0012 0.0015* 
    [1.38] [1.74] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0256** 
     [2.02] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0007 
     [0.07] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2720*** 0.2708*** 0.2674*** 0.2493*** 
  [8.88] [8.93] [8.74] [8.09] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1099 1081 1081 1081 1019 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0027 0.0025 0.0023 0.0024 0.0027 
 [1.66] [1.07] [1.00] [1.03] [1.46] 
Ideology (leftwing)  0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 
 [0.38] [0.15] [0.12] [0.21] [0.22] 
First year legislative period -0.0052 -0.0063* -0.0056 -0.0057 -0.0056 
 [1.03] [1.67] [1.47] [1.48] [1.08] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 
 [0.91] [1.13] [0.97] [0.99] [0.89] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1942** 0.1948** 0.2575*** 
   [2.37] [2.37] [3.04] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0012 0.0015* 
    [1.39] [1.72] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0261** 
     [2.06] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0008 
     [0.08] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2745*** 0.2732*** 0.2697*** 0.2520*** 
  [8.92] [8.98] [8.79] [8.18] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1099 1081 1081 1081 1019 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 34
Table 3:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0013 
 [0.81] [0.32] [0.29] [0.31] [0.67] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.001 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0014 
 [0.83] [1.53] [1.49] [1.54] [1.23] 
First two years legislative period -0.0118** -0.0131*** -0.0126*** -0.0126*** -0.0130*** 
 [2.13] [2.95] [2.79] [2.79] [3.13] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First two years legislative period 0.0033* 0.0036** 0.0034** 0.0034** 0.0037*** 
 [1.81] [2.33] [2.22] [2.22] [2.64] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1871** 0.1877** 0.2492*** 
   [2.27] [2.28] [2.94] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0013 0.0015* 
    [1.40] [1.70] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0256** 
     [2.02] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0003 
     [0.03] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2755*** 0.2742*** 0.2707*** 0.2537*** 
  [9.15] [9.19] [8.99] [8.11] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1099 1081 1081 1081 1019 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. 
Distinction between countries with and without two-party systems 
 Countries without two-party system Countries with two-party system 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Election year 0.0009 0.0001 0.0006 0.0079*** 0.0098*** 0.0097** 
 [0.55] [0.02] [0.21] [3.89] [2.72] [2.30] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0012 0.0004 0.0002 
 [0.31] [0.30] [0.31] [1.39] [0.38] [0.16] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.149   0.0474 
   [1.36]   [0.31] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.001   0.0032 
   [0.76]   [1.47] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0127   0.0263 
   [0.79]   [0.87] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0024   0.008 
   [0.23]   [0.18] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3348*** 0.3178***  0.0021 0.0025 
  [7.76] [8.82]  [0.03] [0.04] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 280 275 265 
Number of countries 16 16 16 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. 
Distinction between countries with and without two-party systems 
 Countries without two-party system Countries with two-party system 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Election year 0.0009 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0065** 0.0080** 0.0082* 
 [0.54] [0.03] [0.20] [3.20] [2.04] [1.86] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0024** 0.0014 0.0011 
 [0.70] [0.65] [0.07] [4.01] [0.94] [0.69] 
First year legislative period -0.0069 -0.0043 -0.0041 0.0073 0.0044 0.0034 
 [1.01] [0.84] [0.68] [1.64] [0.53] [0.46] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0021 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0041* -0.0032 -0.0028 
 [1.10] [0.67] [0.66] [2.53] [1.07] [1.14] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1408   0.0097 
   [1.27]   [0.06] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.001   0.0025 
   [0.75]   [1.18] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0129   0.0221 
   [0.81]   [0.72] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0026   0.0116 
   [0.24]   [0.26] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3348*** 0.3180***  0.0055 0.0079 
  [7.74] [8.76]  [0.08] [0.11] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 280 275 265 
Number of countries 16 16 16 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. 
Distinction between countries with and without two-party systems 
 Countries without two-party system Countries with two-party system 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Election year -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0005 0.0042 0.0056 0.0055 
 [0.15] [0.56] [0.19] [1.44] [1.09] [1.09] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0031 -0.0036* 
 [1.03] [0.45] [0.16] [1.17] [1.56] [1.68] 
First two years legislative period -0.0067 -0.0038 -0.0046 -0.0152* -0.0211*** -0.0223*** 
 [1.14] [0.77] [0.68] [2.20] [2.76] [3.21] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First two years legislative period 0.0016 0.0005 0.001 0.004 0.0061** 0.0066*** 
 [0.88] [0.32] [0.46] [1.59] [2.34] [2.74] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1336   0.081 
   [1.14]   [0.54] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0009   0.0035* 
   [0.73]   [1.65] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0131   0.0288 
   [0.82]   [0.97] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0023   -0.0031 
   [0.22]   [0.07] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3353*** 0.3191***  0.0410 0.0433 
  [7.80] [8.84]  [0.62] [0.65] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 280 275 265 
Number of countries 16 16 16 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias-corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth. 
Decadal dummy variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Election year 0.0029 0.0029 0.003 0.003 
 [1.52] [1.52] [1.55] [1.55] 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0005 
 [1.43] [0.78] [1.42] [0.52] 
Dummy 1951-1960 0.0064    
 [1.10]    
Ideology (leftwing)* 
Dummy 1951-1960 -0.0041**    
 [2.10]    
Dummy 1961-1978  0.0042   
  [0.91]   
Ideology (leftwing)* 
Dummy 1961-1978  0.0001   
  [0.04]   
Dummy 1979-1990   0.0058  
   [1.13]  
Ideology (leftwing)* 
Dummy 1979-1990   -0.0026  
   [1.54]  
Dummy 1991-2006    -0.0128*** 
    [2.60] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
Dummy 1991-2006    0.0043*** 
    [2.70] 
GDP growth trading partners 0.5746*** 0.5163*** 0.5244*** 0.5243*** 
 [11.45] [12.07] [12.22] [11.16] 
Exchange rate regime 0.0003 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 
 [0.34] [0.88] [0.69] [0.67] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP) 0.0333*** 0.0368*** 0.0370*** 0.0370*** 
 [3.54] [3.94] [3.94] [3.94] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz) -0.008 -0.0013 -0.0072 -0.0077 
 [0.77] [0.12] [0.69] [0.73] 
Lagged dependent variable 0.2533*** 0.2401*** 0.2499*** 0.2472*** 
 [10.04] [9.68] [10.17] [9.79] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1099 1081 1081 1081 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average annual GDP growth. 1951-2006. 21 OECD countries. 
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Additional Table 1:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Bjørnskov-Index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0030* 0.0029 0.0027 0.0028 0.0029 
 [1.74] [1.31] [1.23] [1.25] [1.47] 
Ideology (rigthwing) -0.0035* -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0015 
 [1.86] [0.46] [0.46] [0.43] [0.74] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1957*** 0.1960*** 0.2623*** 
   [3.12] [3.12] [3.24] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0011 0.0014* 
    [1.41] [1.79] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0242* 
     [1.82] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0004 
     [0.03] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2647*** 0.2635*** 0.2607*** 0.2485*** 
  [8.10] [7.96] [7.90] [8.49] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1058 1040 1040 1040 1021 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Additional Table 2:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0026 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0025 
 [1.67] [1.04] [0.98] [1.00] [1.25] 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0025 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 
 [1.09] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.17] 
First year legislative period 3×10-5 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.02] [0.10] [0.06] [0.05] [0.09] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0035 
 [0.81] [1.28] [1.27] [1.25] [0.99] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1934*** 0.1938*** 0.2593*** 
   [3.07] [3.07] [3.19] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0011 0.0014* 
    [1.37] [1.75] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0245* 
     [1.84] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0005 
     [0.05] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2674*** 0.2660*** 0.2633*** 0.2510*** 
  [8.27] [8.13] [8.07] [8.61] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1058 1040 1040 1040 1021 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 42
 
Additional Table 3:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0009 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 
 [0.66] [0.10] [0.08] [0.10] [0.36] 
Ideology (rightwing)  0.0011 0.0047 0.0046 0.0046 0.0038 
 [0.35] [1.56] [1.54] [1.54] [1.15] 
First two years legislative period 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 
 [0.14] [0.23] [0.29] [0.28] [0.37] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period -0.0083 -0.0102*** -0.0101*** -0.0099*** -0.0093** 
 [1.56] [2.76] [2.72] [2.69] [2.54] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1867*** 0.1871*** 0.2526*** 
   [2.96] [2.97] [3.12] 
Exchange rate regime    0.001 0.0014* 
    [1.31] [1.70] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0237* 
     [1.78] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     -0.0001 
     [0.01] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2699*** 0.2685*** 0.2659*** 0.2540*** 
  [8.23] [8.10] [8.04] [8.59] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1058 1040 1040 1040 1021 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 4:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries without two-party system. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0003 
 [0.45] [0.14] [0.10] 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0008 3×10-5 -0.0011 
 [0.27] [0.01] [0.31] 
First year legislative period 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.62] [0.05] [0.06] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period -0.0049 -0.0021 -0.0011 
 [0.91] [0.40] [0.23] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1435 
   [1.43] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0011 
   [0.92] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0114 
   [0.74] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0018 
   [0.17] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3271*** 0.3166*** 
  [8.22] [8.82] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 775 756 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 5:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries with two-party system. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0067** 0.0083* 0.0083* 
 [3.30] [1.82] [1.88] 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0053 -0.0025 -0.0019 
 [2.07] [0.59] [0.46] 
First year legislative period -0.0075** -0.0068** -0.0060* 
 [3.28] [1.98] [1.66] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0071* 0.0046 0.0038 
 [2.60] [0.77] [0.62] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0118 
   [0.07] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0026 
   [1.24] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0243 
   [0.80] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0123 
   [0.28] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0127 0.0119 
  [0.18] [0.17] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 265 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 6:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries without two-party system. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0006 
 [0.05] [0.58] [0.20] 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0025 
 [0.61] [0.40] [0.54] 
First two years legislative period -0.0016 -0.0025 -0.0021 
 [0.55] [1.25] [1.05] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period 4×10-5 0.0013 0.0020 
 [0.01] [0.30] [0.37] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1382 
   [1.33] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0011 
   [0.90] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0117 
   [0.76] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0015 
   [0.15] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3283*** 0.3176*** 
  [8.08] [8.87] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 775 756 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 7:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries with two-party system. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0042 0.0057 0.0055 
 [1.39] [1.10] [1.09] 
Ideology (rightwing)  0.0034 0.0087 0.0096* 
 [2.05] [1.56] [1.71] 
First two years legislative period 0.0017 0.0041 0.0049 
 [0.40] [0.96] [1.12] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period -0.0120* -0.0172*** -0.0179*** 
 [2.53] [2.82] [2.94] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0786 
   [0.52] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0035* 
   [1.68] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0255 
   [0.86] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0043 
   [0.10] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0402 0.0393 
  [0.59] [0.58] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 265 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 8:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Lagged Ideology. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0031 0.0031 0.0029* 0.0026 0.0015 
 [1.11] [1.32] [1.71] [1.10] [0.61] 
Ideology (leftwing) t-1 -3×10-6     
 [0.00]     
Ideology (leftwing) t-2  -0.0008    
  [0.92]    
Ideology (leftwing) t-3   0.0006   
   [0.85]   
Ideology (leftwing) t-4    0.0005  
    [0.70]  
Ideology (leftwing) t-5     0.0001 
     [0.16] 
GDP growth trading partners 0.2719*** 0.2604*** 0.3245*** 0.3120*** 0.2715*** 
 [3.43] [3.61] [3.92] [3.96] [3.00] 
Exchange rate regime 0.0012 0.0012 0.0015* 0.0019* 0.0017 
 [1.37] [1.16] [1.82] [1.72] [1.51] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP) 0.0244* 0.0235* 0.02 0.0118 0.0083 
 [1.83] [1.67] [1.46] [1.02] [0.58] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz) 0.0010 0.0009 0.0015 0.0075 0.0071 
 [0.09] [0.11] [0.14] [0.62] [0.58] 
Lagged dependent variable 0.2722*** 0.2702*** 0.2778*** 0.2922*** 0.3005*** 
 [7.54] [8.48] [7.73] [9.35] [9.22] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1017 1014 994 974 954 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 9:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Split Ideology Index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0030 0.0029 0.0027 0.0028 0.0031 
 [1.68] [1.30] [1.21] [1.24] [1.61] 
Dummy rightwing government -0.0078 -0.0081* -0.0081* -0.0080* -0.0082 
 [1.35] [1.87] [1.89] [1.86] [1.46] 
Dummy center government -0.0065 -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0074 -0.0075 
 [1.01] [1.44] [1.51] [1.51] [1.35] 
Dummy leftwing government -0.0052 -0.0063 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0057 
 [0.84] [1.50] [1.55] [1.57] [0.96] 
Dummy very powerful  
Leftwing governemnt -0.0003 -0.0047 -0.0016 -0.0007 0.0035 
 [0.05] [0.27] [0.09] [0.04] [0.23] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.2013** 0.2024** 0.2697*** 
   [2.44] [2.45] [3.20] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0012 0.0015* 
    [1.35] [1.71] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0243* 
     [1.92] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0019 
     [0.18] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2723*** 0.2710*** 0.2676*** 0.2482*** 
  [8.94] [8.97] [8.79] [8.06] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1099 1081 1081 1081 1019 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 10:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year -3×10-5 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0001 
 [0.02] [0.45] [0.44] [0.44] [0.03] 
Ideology (leftwing) -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0005 
 [0.30] [0.39] [0.38] [0.39] [0.61] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0276 0.024 0.3835** 
   [0.26] [0.22] [2.53] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0007 0.0013 
    [0.64] [1.10] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0297** 
     [2.12] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0072 
     [0.84] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2990*** 0.2985*** 0.2970*** 0.2663*** 
  [7.31] [7.32] [7.32] [7.02] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 806 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Additional Table 11:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Non-European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0066** 0.0081* 0.0100** 0.0100** 0.0102** 
 [3.15] [1.94] [2.42] [2.42] [1.97] 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0022** 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 
 [3.83] [0.53] [0.44] [0.33] [0.40] 
GDP growth trading partners   -0.6155*** -0.5887*** -0.5797*** 
   [3.66] [3.16] [2.95] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0012 0.0013 
    [0.35] [0.41] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0097 
     [0.33] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     -0.0353 
     [0.74] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2656*** 0.2339*** 0.2300*** 0.2274*** 
  [4.06] [3.65] [3.55] [3.49] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 275 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 12:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period.  
European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year -1×10-5 -0.0009 -4×10-5 
 [0.01] [0.46] [0.02] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0002 
 [0.76] [0.88] [0.16] 
First year legislative period -0.0070 -0.0051 -0.0043 
 [1.07] [1.17] [0.68] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0020 0.0014 0.0013 
 [1.09] [0.96] [0.66] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.3700** 
   [2.42] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0013 
   [1.10] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0301** 
   [2.13] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0072 
   [0.84] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2986*** 0.2669*** 
  [7.27] [6.99] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 13:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period.  
Non-European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0050*** 0.0060 0.0077 
 [5.15] [1.32] [1.52] 
Ideology (leftwing)  0.0032** 0.0014 0.0014 
 [4.38] [0.81] [0.66] 
First year legislative period 0.0059 0.0012 0.0008 
 [1.67] [0.14] [0.09] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First year legislative period -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0023 
 [1.58] [0.63] [0.83] 
GDP growth trading partners   -0.6169*** 
   [3.06] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0007 
   [0.22] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0079 
   [0.26] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0294 
   [0.60] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2718*** 0.2364*** 
  [4.13] [3.58] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 14:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period.  
European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0008 
 [0.50] [0.87] [0.30] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0001 
 [1.06] [0.56] [0.07] 
First two years legislative period -0.0058 -0.0035 -0.0037 
 [1.01] [0.70] [0.55] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First two years legislative period 0.0014 0.0006 0.0007 
 [0.76] [0.34] [0.37] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.3720** 
   [2.39] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0013 
   [1.11] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0298** 
   [2.12] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.007 
   [0.81] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2985*** 0.2668*** 
  [7.28] [7.00] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53
 
Additional Table 15:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period.  
Non-European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0021 0.0030 0.0049 
 [0.69] [0.53] [0.76] 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0006 -0.0038 -0.0034 
 [0.24] [1.64] [1.29] 
First two years legislative period -0.0172 -0.0254*** -0.0232** 
 [1.62] [2.77] [2.56] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First two years legislative period 0.0047 0.0078*** 0.0069** 
 [1.27] [2.76] [2.19] 
GDP growth trading partners   -0.5259*** 
   [2.70] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0016 
   [0.54] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0132 
   [0.44] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0425 
   [0.90] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2953*** 0.2566*** 
  [4.73] [3.84] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54
 
Additional Table 16:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0004 
 [0.09] [0.44] [0.14] 
Ideology (rightwing)  2×10-5 0.0006 -0.0009 
 [0.01] [0.17] [0.32] 
First year legislative period 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 [0.25] [0.12] [0.15] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period -0.0041 -0.0021 -0.0007 
 [0.91] [0.46] [0.16] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.3663*** 
   [2.68] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0011 
   [1.01] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0282** 
   [2.06] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0066 
   [0.77] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2894*** 0.2662*** 
  [7.07] [6.94] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 775 756 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 17:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.001 
 [0.57] [0.82] [0.40] 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0015 
 [0.24] [0.05] [0.44] 
First two years legislative period -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0016 
 [0.54] [1.03] [0.90] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period -0.0008 0.0003 0.0008 
 [0.16] [0.08] [0.18] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.3633*** 
   [2.65] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0011 
   [1.02] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0283** 
   [2.07] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0064 
   [0.75] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2896*** 0.2665*** 
  [6.94] [6.98] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 775 756 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 18:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Non-European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0057*** 0.0065 0.0078 
 [5.63] [1.25] [1.55] 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0080** -0.0014 -0.0009 
 [3.76] [0.24] [0.15] 
First year legislative period -0.0041 -0.0032 -0.0046 
 [0.88] [0.66] [0.93] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0015 
 [0.36] [0.33] [0.19] 
GDP growth trading partners   -0.6058*** 
   [3.01] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0011 
   [0.35] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0097 
   [0.32] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0285 
   [0.60] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2729*** 0.2389*** 
  [4.21] [3.60] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 265 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 19:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index. 
Non-European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0010 0.0012 0.0028 
 [0.29] [0.18] [0.44] 
Ideology (rightwing)  0.0031 0.0144** 0.0144** 
 [0.58] [2.03] [2.07] 
First two years legislative period 0.0026 0.0063 0.0058 
 [0.58] [1.14] [1.05] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period -0.0177 -0.0272*** -0.0257*** 
 [2.04] [3.19] [3.16] 
GDP growth trading partners   -0.5102*** 
   [2.67] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0019 
   [0.66] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0074 
   [0.25] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0485 
   [1.06] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2901*** 0.2544*** 
  [4.59] [3.93] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 265 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 20:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth. 
Decadal dummy variables. Bjørnskov-Index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Election year 0.0027 0.0028 0.0027 0.0029 
 [1.35] [1.41] [1.37] [1.46] 
Ideology (rightwing) -0.0028 -4×10-6 0.0003 -0.0042* 
 [1.31] [0.00] [0.12] [1.80] 
Dummy 1951-1960 -0.0095***    
 [3.07]    
Ideology (rightwing)* 
Dummy 1951-1960 0.0100**    
 [2.30]    
Dummy 1961-1978  0.0066***   
  [3.19]   
Ideology (rightwing)* 
Dummy 1961-1978  -0.0066   
  [1.60]   
Dummy 1979-1990   -0.0046**  
   [2.29]  
Ideology (rightwing)* 
Dummy 1979-1990   0.0091***  
   [2.66]  
Dummy 1991-2006    0.0020 
    [1.01] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
Dummy 1991-2006    -0.0069* 
    [1.75] 
GDP growth trading partners 0.5764*** 0.5199*** 0.5283*** 0.5292*** 
 [11.81] [12.70] [11.67] [12.74] 
Exchange rate regime 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
 [0.46] [0.76] [0.79] [0.54] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP) 0.0333*** 0.0369*** 0.0374*** 0.0367*** 
 [3.55] [3.94] [4.00] [3.91] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz) -0.0101 -0.0008 -0.0092 -0.0069 
 [0.97] [0.08] [0.87] [0.66] 
Lagged dependent variable 0.2533*** 0.2380*** 0.2520*** 0.2487*** 
 [10.85] [10.38] [10.60] [11.08] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1021 1021 1021 1021 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 21:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Sample 1951-1963. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0060 0.0075 0.0068 0.0067 0.0073 
 [1.22] [1.30] [1.14] [1.13] [1.36] 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0038** 0.0025 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 
 [2.59] [0.86] [0.64] [0.61] [0.57] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.3366 0.3302 0.4663** 
   [1.64] [1.61] [2.44] 
Exchange rate regime    -0.0030 -0.0084 
    [0.53] [1.23] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0232 
     [0.86] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     -0.0122 
     [0.39] 
Lagged dependent variable   0.3366 0.3302 0.4663** 
   [1.64] [1.61] [2.44] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 233 215 215 215 203 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 17 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional Table 22:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Sample 1964-1992. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
 [0.59] [0.37] [0.34] [0.36] [0.40] 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0001 4×10-6 0.0001 0.0001 3×10-6 
 [0.09] [0.00] [0.13] [0.07] [0.00] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1991 0.2155* 0.2388** 
   [1.56] [1.67] [2.23] 
Exchange rate regime    0.0018 0.0018 
    [1.29] [1.31] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0001 
     [0.00] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     0.0064 
     [0.42] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2763*** 0.2714*** 0.2683*** 0.2695*** 
  [5.49] [5.34] [5.31] [5.14] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 572 555 555 555 548 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 23:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Sample 1993-2006. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Election year 0.0053 0.0070*** 0.0061** 0.0061** 0.0068** 
 [1.44] [2.65] [2.31] [2.31] [2.32] 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0018 0.001 0.0011 0.001 0.0019* 
 [1.48] [1.10] [1.16] [1.15] [1.74] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.5419*** 0.5424*** 0.5512*** 
   [3.52] [3.54] [2.86] 
Exchange rate regime    -0.0004 0.0008 
    [0.24] [0.47] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)     0.0798*** 
     [3.30] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)     -0.017 
     [0.81] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3888*** 0.3918*** 0.3944*** 0.4165*** 
  [6.22] [6.44] [6.45] [5.82] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 294 273 273 273 231 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 24:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period.  
Countries without two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0001 
 [0.70] [0.65] [0.07] 
First year legislative period -0.0069 -0.0043 -0.0041 
 [1.02] [0.84] [0.68] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0021 0.0012 0.0012 
 [1.10] [0.68] [0.65] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1395 
   [1.27] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0010 
   [0.75] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0129 
   [0.80] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0025 
   [0.23] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3347*** 0.3181*** 
  [7.75] [8.71] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 25:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period.  
Countries with two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (leftwing)  0.0023** 0.0014 0.0010 
 [3.86] [0.92] [0.65] 
First year legislative period 0.0065 0.0037 0.0027 
 [1.71] [0.43] [0.35] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First year legislative period -0.0042* -0.0034 -0.0030 
 [2.55] [1.15] [1.23] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0347 
   [0.21] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0025 
   [1.17] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0264 
   [0.84] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0067 
   [0.15] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0150 0.0172 
  [0.23] [0.25] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63
 
Additional Table 26:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries without two-party system. 
Election year excluded.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0008 3×10-5 -0.0011 
 [0.27] [0.01] [0.31] 
First year legislative period 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.59] [0.05] [0.07] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period -0.0050 -0.0021 -0.0012 
 [0.95] [0.40] [0.23] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1429 
   [1.43] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0011 
   [0.92] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0114 
   [0.74] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0018 
   [0.17] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3270*** 0.3166*** 
  [8.23] [8.76] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 775 756 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 27:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First year legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries with two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0052* -0.0023 -0.0017 
 [2.13] [0.55] [0.41] 
First year legislative period -0.0087** -0.0086*** -0.0076** 
 [3.57] [2.60] [2.21] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First year legislative period 0.0073* 0.0052 0.0041 
 [2.28] [0.86] [0.67] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0369 
   [0.23] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0026 
   [1.23] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0289 
   [0.91] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0069 
   [0.16] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0223 0.0218 
  [0.33] [0.32] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 265 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65
 
Additional Table 28:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period.  
Countries without two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0003 
 [1.03] [0.47] [0.17] 
First two years  legislative period -0.0067 -0.0036 -0.0045 
 [1.12] [0.72] [0.67] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First two year s legislative period 0.0016 0.0006 0.0010 
 [0.88] [0.34] [0.47] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1353 
   [1.18] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0009 
   [0.73] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0131 
   [0.82] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0024 
   [0.22] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3349*** 0.3189*** 
  [7.82] [8.82] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 29:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period.  
Countries with two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (leftwing)  -0.0013 -0.0033* -0.0038* 
 [1.37] [1.66] [1.78] 
First two years legislative period -0.0173* -0.0238*** -0.0250*** 
 [2.69] [3.29] [3.58] 
Ideology (leftwing)* 
First two years legislative period 0.0042 0.0063** 0.0069*** 
 [1.73] [2.42] [2.82] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0970 
   [0.63] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0036* 
   [1.67] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0301 
   [1.00] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0055 
   [0.12] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0479 0.0498 
  [0.72] [0.75] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 30:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries without two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (rightwing)  -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0025 
 [0.61] [0.44] [0.55] 
First two years legislative period -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.002 
 [0.55] [1.18] [1.05] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period 5×10-5 0.0016 0.0021 
 [0.01] [0.36] [0.40] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1401 
   [1.38] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0011 
   [0.91] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0117 
   [0.76] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0016 
   [0.16] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3276*** 0.3173*** 
  [8.08] [8.86] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788 775 756 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68
 
Additional Table 31:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Rational Partisan Theory. First two years legislative period. Bjørnskov-Index.  
Countries with two-party system. 
Election year excluded. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (rightwing)  0.0037 0.0092 0.0101* 
 [2.01] [1.64] [1.79] 
First two years legislative period 0.0005 0.0023 0.0033 
 [0.13] [0.61] [0.85] 
Ideology (rightwing)* 
First two years legislative period -0.0125* -0.0177*** -0.0185*** 
 [2.51] [2.88] [3.00] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0939 
   [0.61] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0036* 
   [1.69] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0266 
   [0.89] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0068 
   [0.16] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0465 0.0454 
  [0.69] [0.68] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 265 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 32:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Countries without two-party system. 
Only Election.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year  -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0019 
 [0.57] [0.93] [0.68] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0947 
   [0.83] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0009 
   [0.70] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0067 
   [0.46] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   -0.0058 
   [0.52] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2767*** 0.2465*** 
  [7.60] [5.86] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 33:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Countries with two-party system. 
Only Election. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Election year 0.0077** 0.0097*** 0.0096** 
 [3.91] [2.72] [2.30] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0477 
   [0.31] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0033 
   [1.56] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0262 
   [0.87] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0079 
   [0.18] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0045 0.0035 
  [0.06] [0.05] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 34:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Countries without two-party system. 
Only Ideology (leftwing). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (leftwing) -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0003 
 [0.31] [0.30] [0.31] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.1476 
   [1.36] 
Exchange rate regime   -0.0010 
   [0.76] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0126 
   [0.78] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0023 
   [0.22] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.3348*** 0.3179*** 
  [7.77] [8.77] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 819 806 754 
Number of countries 16 16 16 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Additional Table 35:  Regression Results. 
Dynamic bias corrected estimator. 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP growth.  
Countries with two-party system. 
Only Ideology (leftwing). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideology (leftwing) 0.0011 0.0003 0.0001 
 [1.22] [0.27] [0.04] 
GDP growth trading partners   0.0917 
   [0.58] 
Exchange rate regime   0.0035 
   [1.55] 
∆ ln trade (as a share of GDP)   0.0323 
   [1.02] 
Institutional constraints (Henisz)   0.0008 
   [0.02] 
Lagged dependent variable  0.0097 0.0091 
  [0.14] [0.13] 
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed period effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 280 275 265 
Number of countries 5 5 5 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 

